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SOCIAL REALITY, THE BOUNDARIES OF SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY, 
 
AND ECONOMICS 
ABSTRACT 
 
Organizational scholars have recently argued that economic theories and assumptions have 
adversely shaped management practice and human behavior, leading not only to the 
incorporation of trust-eroding market-mechanisms into organizations but also unnecessarily 
creating self-interested behavior.  A number of highly influential papers have argued that 
the self-fulfilling nature of (even false) theories provides the underlying mechanism 
through which economics has adversely shaped not just social science but also 
management practice and individual behavior.  We question these arguments, and argue 
that there are important boundary conditions to theories falsely fulfilling themselves, 
boundary conditions that have hitherto been unexplored in organizational research, and 
boundary conditions which question the underlying premises used by organizational 
scholars and social scientists to attack economics.  We specifically build on highly relevant 
findings from social psychology, philosophy and organizational economics to show how 
(1) objective reality and (2) human nature provide two important boundary conditions for 
theories (falsely or otherwise) fulfilling themselves.  We also defend organizational 
economics, specifically the use of high-powered incentives in organizations, and argue that 
self-interest (rightly understood) facilitates in creating beneficial individual and collective 
and societal outcomes.  
KEY WORDS: organization theory and social reality, organizational economics, philosophy 
of social science 
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INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT 
Organizational scholars have recently challenged the application and use of economics in 
management research and practice.  For example, in a recent award-winning paper Ferraro, Pfeffer 
and Sutton (2005) argue that the language and assumptions of economics have adversely influenced 
human behavior, specifically creating more self-interested behavior and also leading to the 
widespread acceptance of trust-eroding market mechanisms and bad management practices within 
organizations.  Ghoshal and Moran (1996) have made similar points by arguing that the prescriptions 
and assumptions of economic theories have led to increased self-interest and bad management 
practice.  Organizational scholars have also recently argued that there are (both direct and indirect) 
causal links not just between the widespread acceptance, teaching and diffusion of economic theories 
and bad management practice, but also between the teaching of economics in business schools and 
recent corporate ethics scandals (e.g., Adler 2002, Adler and Jermier 2005, Ferraro et al. 2005, 
Ghoshal 2003, 2005, Gintis and Khurana 2007, Harris and Bromiley 2007, Khurana 2007, Pfeffer 
1997, 2005). 
Organizational scholars have thus far spoken with a seemingly unified voice in challenging 
economic theories in their role in adversely shaping human behavior and in adversely influencing 
management practice.  Very few defenses of economic reasoning have been published in the 
organizational literature (see Williamson 1996, Zenger and Hesterly 1997), and importantly, the 
more general logic of the self-fulfilling nature of (false economic) theories has not been questioned 
or challenged. Unfortunately scholars directly implicated by these arguments?namely scholars in 
economics and other disciplines such as psychology and philosophy?are unlikely to be aware of 
these discussions in management journals; and, even if they were, they may not have inclinations to 
write an article providing the other side of the argument.  
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The specific goal of this paper, then, is to provide the other side of the argument, that is, to 
defend organizational economics and to in part question the apparent consensus regarding economics 
adversely shaping human behavior, management practice and organizational outcomes (e.g., Ferraro 
et al. 2005, Ghoshal and Moran 1996, cf. Khurana 2007).  Note, however, that the goal of this paper 
is not to defend all economic assumptions (for example, agent omniscience or hyper-rationality); 
rather, we focus on those elements of economic theory which have recently been highlighted by 
management scholars as having adverse effects.  We specifically respond to these extant arguments 
by carefully discussing the underlying theoretical and philosophical assumptions that management 
scholars have made when linking economic theories with the suggested adverse effects on human 
behavior and management practice.  That is, arguments related to theory (and associated 
assumptions) shaping or determining human behavior in self-fulfilling fashion (Ferraro et al. 2005, 
Ghoshal and Moran 1996) directly implicate disciplines such as social psychology and philosophy. 
We therefore cite and build on key theoretical and empirical insights from these disciplines not only 
to question these arguments but also to highlight different conclusions. Importantly, we explicate the 
boundaries for the self-fulfilling nature of theories and highlight an alternative interpretation for why 
and how (economic or other) theories influence reality.  Key insights from organizational economics 
also feature prominently in our discussion.  For example, we discuss the important role that self-
interested behavior ? that is, self-interest “rightly understood” ?  has in creating beneficial 
collective outcomes.  Furthermore, we discuss how self-interested behavior scarcely precludes 
cooperation, trust or any other human or organizational virtue.  We also highlight the benefits 
associated with “markets in hierarchy” (Zenger and Hesterly 1997). 
Note that for purposes of parsimony we will largely concentrate on the arguments made by 
Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) ? henceforth referred to as “FPS” in this article ? as this award-
winning and already highly-cited article is one of the latest, most sophisticated, theoretically 
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consistent and strong statements about the self-fulfilling nature of theories: specifically the case of 
economics adversely and “falsely” shaping human behavior and management practice.  We thus 
recognize and note that there are a host of other papers published in a wide variety of management 
outlets making broadly related arguments about economics adversely shaping behavior and more 
generally about the self-fulfilling nature of (even false) theories (e.g., Adler 2002, Adler and 
Heckscher 2006, Astley 1985, Astley and Zammuto 1992, Barley and Kunda 1992, Cannella and 
Paetzold 1994, Frey and Osterloh 2005, Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Ghoshal 2005, Green 2004, 
Khurana 2007, McKinley, Mone, and Moon 1999, Pfeffer 1997, 2005).  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND SOCIAL REALITY:  
SOME BACKGROUND 
 The key mechanism that has been proposed for driving the suggested adverse influence that 
economic theories (and associated assumptions and language) has had on human behavior, 
management practice, and organizational outcomes is the self-fulfilling or reflexive nature of theories 
(FPS, Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Pfeffer 1997).  That is, while theories have traditionally been 
conceptualized as tools for understanding and explaining (a given) reality (Goldman 1999, Nagel 
1961, Popper 1972), a relatively recent argument is that there is a strong reflexive nature between 
theories and reality (Bloor 1991, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Kuhn 1970): theories and associated language 
and assumptions in effect shape, construct and determine reality in self-fulfilling fashion rather than 
merely describing or explaining reality.  In fact ?  and this will prove critical for our subsequent 
arguments ? the argument is not just that theories influence reality in self-fulfilling and reflexive 
fashion, as management scholars we all indeed hope that this is the case, but rather, the “strong form” 
of the argument is that even false theories and associated false specifications of reality in effect 
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evoke behaviors, in self-fulfilling fashion, “which make the originally false conception come true” 
(Merton 1948: 195, italics in original, FPS: 8).   
 It is this very tradition, specifically its strong form where even false theories also fulfill 
themselves, that FPS build on: the false prediction and assumption of individual self-interest from 
economics creates self-interested behavior in self-fulfilling fashion, with the theory diffusing into 
management practice via the assumptions and language of economics.1  Put differently, FPS argue 
that economic theories do not explain reality (at least initially); rather, the false expectation of self-
interested behavior by economic theories creates self-interested behavior in self-fulfilling fashion. 
Economics, then, only “explains” reality and behavior post hoc, that is, after its assumptions become 
widely adopted and subsequently reflected in the behavior of individuals.  
The idea that theorizing affects the objects of theorizing ? notions of self-fulfilling prophecy 
or “reflexivity” ? has been an important one in sociology since Thomas (1923) and Merton (1948) 
(e.g., Giddens 1990, Bourdieu 1992), and has become an anchoring foundation in the sociology of 
knowledge, particularly in the literature on the social construction of knowledge and reality, and the 
problem of “truth” (e.g., Barnes and Bloor 1982, Bloor 1991, Kuhn 1970, Latour 1999).  The 
reflexive and self-fulfilling nature of theories has also been a reoccurring theme in economics (in 
connection with predictions and the modeling of expectations) (Grunberg and Modigliani 1954, 
Lucas 1977), and it has been treated by philosophers as well (Popper 1957).  
The Need to Specify Boundaries for the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Theories 
 The strong forms of the self-fulfilling nature of theories and language are sobering because, if 
true, they threaten the fundamental definition of science and theory as an attempt to understand and 
predict objective reality (see Goldman 1999, Popper 1972, Psillos 1999).  Specifically, the self-
fulfilling nature of even false theories makes deeply problematic such traditional scientific notions as 
explanation, prediction, description, understanding and control.  To illustrate: the theoretically all-
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important “why”-question (Popper 1972, cf. Nagel 1961) ? for example, why someone behaved or 
acted in a certain way ? in a rather sobering twist gets explained by theories and associated 
language itself rather than being based on any underlying realities or human universals that might 
explain that behavior (cf. Brown 1991).  The strong form of the argument is also sobering as it makes 
scientists and scholars themselves (in some part) directly responsible for how individuals behave ? 
this indeed is the explicit argument by FPS with regard to the false assumptions of economics and the 
resultant, self-fulfilling self-interested behavior (FPS: 15, also see Adler 2002, Ghoshal 2005, Pfeffer 
2005). 
But, a key problem in citing or evoking the self-fulfilling nature of theories and language is 
the lack of boundaries in making these arguments, that is, scholars have not been clear about the 
“conditions that limit prophecy fulfillment” (Jussim 1986: 429, cf. Henshel 1982).  It is not clear 
when exactly theories and associated language are self-fulfilling, and, whether theories and 
associated language in all situations ? again, even when based on false premises, as is explicitly 
argued by FPS in terms of economics ? create and construct the very reality that the theory seeks to 
explain.  A natural extension of FPS, and related strong forms of the argument, is that any (even 
false) reality can be created through theory, language and prophecy, which subsequently fulfills 
itself.  Clearly this does not sound plausible.  Thus, an examination of the boundaries for self-
fulfilling prophecy is needed.   
 
BOUNDARIES FOR THE SELF-FULFILLING NATURE OF THEORIES:  
OBJECTIVE REALITY AND HUMAN NATURE  
We discuss two important boundary conditions delimiting the extent to which theories, 
particularly false ones, are self-fulfilling: 1) objective reality and 2) human nature.  We highlight 
theoretical, logical and empirical evidence, which shows that objective reality and human nature 
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provide important boundaries for self-fulfilling prophecy, boundaries that have yet to be articulated 
in management research, and boundaries which make the strong forms of self-fulfilling prophecy 
tenuous to accept. We specifically utilize many of the same examples as FPS (from economics and 
social psychology), and explain how a sensitivity to these boundaries fundamentally changes their 
underlying conclusions.  
The Boundary of Objective Reality 
An important boundary of self-fulfilling prophecy, with momentous consequences for FPS’s 
argument, is objective reality.  In discussing objective reality as the boundary for self-fulfilling 
prophecy we adopt the position of “scientific realism,” that is, the argument that there are objective 
facts and truths in the social world (independent of our theories about them), and that science, 
including organization and management science, fundamentally is about explanation and 
understanding (Goldman 1999, Popper 1972, Psillos 1999).2  Note that this realist perspective 
scarcely precludes the fact that theories can and do shape social reality and behavior.  We will in fact 
delineate the reasons why and how true theories indeed affect the objects that they theorize about, 
and discuss why and how theories influence human behavior and management practice more 
generally.  However, our reasons for why and when theories shape social reality will be 
fundamentally different from the ones articulated by FPS (see FPS: 10-17).  
To then highlight how objective reality provides an important boundary for the self-fulfilling 
prophecy nature of theories we discuss two key sub-points: (a) why and how theories affect reality, 
and (b) objective reality and assumptions about rationality. 
Why and how do theories affect and shape reality? While this may seem simplistic and 
naive, we argue that theories affect reality when they are true (see Bonjour 1999, Goldman 1999, 
Popper 1972).  Or put differently, self-fulfilling prophecies based on true predictions, rather than 
false ones, affect reality. (We will also concurrently explicate how false theories may shape reality in 
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the short-term.) Theories then affect reality because they capture and explain underlying objective 
realities better than alternative conceptualizations of that reality (Psillos 1999).  
To illustrate our point, consider the Chicago Board of Exchange (CBE) and the influence that 
the Black-Scholes model had on its operations.  We specifically use CBE and the Black-Scholes 
model as an example as FPS (12-13; Fourcade, 2007a: 1025) argue that there is “no clearer 
demonstration” of the self-fulfilling nature of economic theories (also see MacKenzie and Millo 
2003, MacKenzie 2006). In short, FPS’s argument is that rather than merely explaining the market or 
helping us understand markets and options prices, the Black-Scholes model corrected and 
constructed new market dynamics at CBE, specifically where within days the prices of options 
reflected the reality and assumptions of the Black-Scholes model itself.  The argument, then, is that 
financial models in effect cause or construct markets in “performative” fashion (see Callon 1998, 
MacKenzie 2006, MacKenzie and Millo 2003) rather than merely helping us explain or understand 
them.  
We agree that the Black-Scholes model affected reality, specifically, option prices. But, the 
key question is, why? It is critical to note that the reason the Black-Scholes model affected reality 
was because the model helped better explain ? though not perfectly ? the underlying realities about 
a “truer” value of option prices that existed (Black and Scholes 1973).  Thus, not just any (false or 
other) prophecies and theoretical claims about option value could be made by these scholars; rather, 
the underlying realities that the model tapped into better explained a more true value of options and 
thus not only helped explain options prices, but, the model also in turn helped shape and change 
option prices themselves (cf. MacKenzie 2006).  The important point here is that because theories are 
better than alternative explanations in terms of describing and explaining and approximating truth or 
reality, they then in turn create associated real value and are thus “self-fulfilling.”  In the physical 
sciences similarly, we would not argue that Einstein somehow in self-fulfilling fashion created or 
10 
constructed nature (or, that Pasteur created microbes – though, see this argument by Latour and 
Woolgar 1979, cf. Psillos 1999); or put even more strongly, that Einstein could have created just any 
false conceptions of nature that would subsequently fulfill themselves.  Rather, Einstein’s correct (or 
rather, better) theories and models about objective reality help us first to understand and explain 
objective reality, and secondarily his (more) correct theories have been harnessed toward various 
(good and bad) uses (see Boghossian 2006, Brown 1994, 2001, cf. Goldman 1999).  Thus we 
certainly recognize that theories have a reflexive loop where they also shape reality and behavior, but 
they do so first and foremost when they are better (or “truer”) than alternative explanations at 
capturing underlying realities.   
In contrast, note that FPS specifically argue that the reason why economics has become self-
fulfilling (or, why it influences reality) is because economics “dominates the discourse” (see FPS: 18, 
also see Fourcade 2007b, Knorr-Cetina 1999, cf. Kitcher 2003).  Thus, the reasons why the theory is 
influential specifically then has more to do with social power and the widespread diffusion and 
acceptance of the discipline of economics rather than any real reasons related to the accuracy of 
economic theories themselves in capturing reality (FPS specifically cite Dumont 1977 and Fourcade-
Gourinchas 2004 in making this case; also see Bloor 1991, Callon 1998, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Kuhn 
1970).  In fact, it is the explicit argument of FPS that critical parts of economic theory are false.3  We 
of course do not question the fact that false theories propagate themselves; history provides more 
than ample evidence that wrong theories have widely propagated themselves (Bloor 1991). However, 
the readily evident historical and scientific accumulation of truths and objective facts suggests that 
theoretical progress is the overall mode of science (Niiniluoto 1984, Popper 1972), specifically where 
increasingly better, more correct, or “truer” models and approximations of reality also then in turn 
help to shape that reality over time (Psillos 1999, also see Boghossian 2006, Brown 1994, 2001, 
Goldman 1999).  The natural sciences provide an example of this progression toward “truth,” where 
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“Einstein’s theory offered a better approximation to truth than Newton’s theory, and Newton’s theory 
in turn offered a better approximation of truth than Kepler’s theory” (Popper 1972: 59, Psillos 1999).   
To further illustrate how objective reality puts a boundary on the self-fulfilling nature of 
theories; consider the question of why some assumptions of economic theories have not fulfilled 
themselves, while others have.  Specifically, while FPS focus on the self-fulfilling nature of the 
assumption of self-interest, neoclassical economics has traditionally also made strong assumptions of 
agent omniscience or hyper-rationality.  The assumption of hyper-rationality means that agents have 
full knowledge of (their own and other agents’) preferences and choices and the consequences of 
associated actions; hence for example the assumption of fully efficient markets (cf. Friedman 1953).  
However, it is quite clear that despite the dominance and power of economics in the social sciences 
(FPS), the theoretical assumption of agent omniscience has not fulfilled itself.  This raises the 
question, why do some aspects of economic theory (or other theories for that matter) appear to be 
self-fulfilling (such as self-interest), while others are not (such as hyper-rationality)? 
The answer is that objective reality intervenes: the boundary of objective reality means that 
not just any false theoretical claims, assumptions, or prophecies can be made, which would 
subsequently be fulfilled; some things simply are not possible (cf. Popper 1972).  Now, economists 
have traditionally pointed to “economic fundamentals” as objective social constraints, and these 
fundamentals place constraints on self-fulfilling prophecy.  For example, scarcity is everywhere, 
economizing is imperative.  However, economizing with scarce mental resources precludes agent 
omniscience from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy (cf. Simon 1954).  Specifically, the economic 
assumption of agent omniscience is based on a false and unrealistic conception of human decision-
making capabilities, and thus has not fulfilled itself in the real world despite being central to and 
pervasive in economics.  The assumption of omniscience of course has been used as a convenient 
tool for simplifying arguments and models regarding markets (though, also challenged by many in 
economics, see Hayek 1945).  But, the more important and instructive point to note here is that agent 
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omniscience has not fulfilled itself despite it being central to key strands of economics.  The 
assumption of omniscience has specifically not fulfilled itself as it is not true and thus underlying 
objective realities about human capabilities provide a boundary for prophecy fulfillment.  In other 
words, there is an objective social reality that provides a boundary for prophecy fulfillment, or, 
conversely, an underlying real basis for accepting the reasons for why a particular prophecy or theory 
might fulfill itself (cf. Boudon 1998).    
Objective reality and assumptions about rationality. The arguments of FPS about the false 
fulfillment of prophecy, reveals much about their underlying assumptions about human rationality 
and information availability: even false definitions of situations cause individuals to behave in an 
irrational manner and in collectively hurtful ways.  This in fact, FPS argue, is perhaps the most 
critical point of their paper: “Perhaps the most important implication of this paper is that theories 
become dominant when their language is widely and mindlessly used and their assumptions become 
accepted and normatively valued, regardless of their empirical validity” (FPS: 21, italics added, also 
see Astley and Zammutto 1992).  In other words, the strong focus on the fulfillment of prophecy 
based on false premises or a priori primed false beliefs and expectations suggests that humans are 
“mindless” and readily duped into false realities (see FPS: 8-9, 21, Gilovich 1991).  Of course we 
recognize that individuals often do appear to behave mindlessly on what appear to be false premises. 
However, the problem in part is that scholars highlight systematically mindless behavior post hoc, 
but do not consider the extent to which these mindlessly-behaving individuals have the information 
needed (or, time or resources to gather additional information) to make an accurate judgment about 
the objective facts and about objective reality.  
To illustrate, consider the case of a run on a bank induced by a random rumor; the run on a 
bank indeed provides the quintessential and original example of a false self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Merton 1948). In this case we may say that we have a false reality fulfilling itself ? “false” because 
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the bank in reality is not in trouble ? and individuals are thus behaving “mindlessly” as they pull 
their money out.  But, note that it may be perfectly rational on the part of individuals and agents to 
pull their money from the bank given the information that they have at that moment (cf. Banerjee 
1992, Vaugirard 2005), though it may appear that they are mindlessly following the false prophecy. 
Thus the false prophecy fulfilling itself may better be attributed to the lack of information on the part 
of individuals and agents rather than being attributed to mindless, irrational behavior and false 
prophecy fulfillment.    
Note also that the “initially false definition of the situation evoking a behavior which makes 
the originally false conception come true” (cf. Merton 1948: 195, italics in original; Merton’s classic 
definition of self-fulfilling prophecy) may dynamically, in Bayesian fashion, self-correct itself over 
time as additional information becomes available about the underlying true objective realities of the 
situation, such as the solvency of the bank. It is thus important to recognize a temporal dynamic in 
false prophecy fulfillment, where individuals in Bayesian fashion update their expectancies (or, the 
prophecies) and behaviors as additional information about underlying objective facts and truth over 
time become available, thus correcting the initially false self-fulfilling facts and behaviors (cf. 
Henschel 1982, Kukla 1994).  Individuals thus behave and take actions with the information that they 
have at that moment, based on reasoning and information that they find convincing (Boudon 1998, 
2003).  These reasons may of course be proven false post-hoc (suggesting mindless behavior), but 
reasons which a priori are rational on an individual basis given the information and time that is 
available (for an excellent overview, see McKenzie 2005).4  
Implicit in our arguments then about objective reality providing a boundary for whether false 
prophecies and beliefs fulfill themselves is that we presume, counter to FPS (21), that individuals 
have abilities to judge objective reality, that they seek truth and information (Goldman 1999), and 
that they the are not necessarily easily or mindlessly duped (at least in the long-run) by just any false 
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conceptions and beliefs. Individual conceptions of the environment and social reality, while 
potentially initially false given the lack of information or the lack of time to gather or process that 
information (cf. McKenzie 2003), are dynamically updated by individuals and organizations over 
time as additional information is received and considered.  In short, allowing for an increased 
measure of rationality in human behavior is warranted (see McKenzie and Mikkelsen 2007, 
McKenzie 2003, 2005, Oaksford and Chater 1996, Funder 1987), and, this increase in rationality 
questions whether people truly buy into false definitions of situations and thus behave “mindlessly” 
(FPS: 21), specifically on a systemic basis (though they may behave mindlessly on an idiosyncratic, 
individual basis ? Stanovich 1999, Krueger and Funder 2004).5 
The Boundary of Human Nature 
 Human nature provides the second boundary for the self-fulfilling nature of theories.  More 
generally, how human nature is specified is critical in social science research as forcefully noted by 
Herbert Simon: “nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our 
research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behavior we are studying” 
(1985: 303). Specifically, a key question, then, when citing the self-fulfilling nature of theories is 
whether there are any constants or universals to human nature and human behavior, or, as 
emphasized by FPS when making their arguments (FPS: 8-10, cf. Ghoshal and Moran 1996), do “our 
beliefs about human nature [in self-fulfilling fashion] shape human nature itself” (Frank 1988: 237)? 
Unquestionably both are true, but, the central question at stake when evoking self-fulfilling 
prophecy, particularly its strong forms, is: to what extent? Which of the two predominantly drives 
human behavior and performance: human nature itself or beliefs about it?  
FPS’s conception of human nature is one of strong situational and social malleability.  This 
conception of human nature is rooted in a foundational “first principle” of important strands of social 
science:  Durkheim for example argues that “individual natures are merely the indeterminate material 
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that the social factor molds and transforms” (1962: 106), or as put by Geertz: “[t]here is no such 
thing as human nature independent of culture” (1973: 49; cf. Mead 1928, Brandts et al 2004).  Thus, 
social beliefs and expectations about human nature, rather than an underlying universal human nature 
itself, are given special emphasis in determining individual behavior.  The argument of the 
malleability of human nature is also an underlying (though implicit) foundation for the many bodies 
of research cited as support by FPS for the falsely self-fulfilling nature of theories, specifically, 
research that notes the role that various external contingencies play in shaping and determining 
human behavior and perceptions of reality.  These external contingencies include: others’ beliefs 
(Frank 1988), language (Sapir 1911, 1929, Whorf 1956), expectations and perceptions (Rosenthal 
and Jacobson 1968), social stereotypes (Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977), and images (Miller 
1999, cf. Bloor 1991) and so forth (see FPS: 8-15).   
While we do not wish to question the importance of, for example, socialization processes, 
what is questionable is whether human nature truly is as malleable as suggested by FPS’s thesis 
where even false beliefs, conceptions, language, expectations, priming of others about human nature 
in essence change and determine human nature itself?  Aren’t there universals and constants in 
human nature; what is the other side of the argument?  As discussed, the fact that the economic 
assumption of agent omniscience or hyper-rationality has not fulfilled itself of course provides one 
excellent example of human nature as a boundary for what theories and expectations actually do 
fulfill themselves; but, there is now also a rich literature which has directly tested this boundary and 
noted the importance of constants in human nature.   
Specifically, there is a large and ever-growing body of research that persuasively argues and 
shows that there is underlying universal human nature that deserves careful consideration (Chomsky 
1957, 2003, Markozcy and Goldberg 1998, cf. Pinker 2002) ? in essence questioning the strong 
malleability of human nature implied by FPS’s thesis.6 Recent theoretical and empirical work in fact 
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has tested and measured the relative effects of human nature versus prophecy. FPS indeed cite one 
strand of this work and debate (also see Ghoshal and Moran 1996), specifically highlighting the role 
that priming, expectancy, language and various other external contingencies and situational factors 
? for example, theories and assumptions that others have about an individual ? play in determining 
individual behavior and performance (e.g., Kay and Ross 2003, Miller 1999).  The work that FPS and 
others cite builds on classic studies of self-fulfilling prophecy that look at the “Pygmalion”-effect, for 
example where teacher expectations and beliefs about student capability (primed in an experimental 
laboratory setting) determine student outcomes (e.g., Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968, Dweck and 
Leggett 1988).    
However, a different strand in social psychology also exists and questions these findings, in 
particular the effect-sizes of these findings.  This research explicitly is cognizant of human nature 
and has empirically tested the extent to which other’s expectations and beliefs fulfill themselves in 
individual behavior versus the extent to which there are real underlying individual-level determinants 
of behavior and performance.  Specifically, theoretical and empirical work by social psychologists 
such as Jussim, Funder, Kenny and colleagues has shown that other’s expectations and beliefs about 
individual behavior predict that behavior not because of self-fulfilling prophecy-effects, but rather, 
because beliefs and expectations about others’ behaviors are relatively accurate ? that is, they are 
rooted in actual characteristics of human nature rather than arbitrary or false beliefs about it (see 
Funder 1987, 1995, Jussim 1986, 1991, Kenny 1991, Kenny et al 2001).  Furthermore, importantly, 
these expectations and beliefs about others, particularly when false, are dynamically updated over 
time (in Bayesian fashion – McKenzie and Mikkelsen 2007, Jussim 1991, also see Funder 1987, 
Jussim 1989).  
Scholars have also been able to study the relative magnitudes of human nature (e.g., various 
dispositional characteristics) versus prophecy effects (e.g., beliefs or expectations about dispositions 
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or human nature) through variance decomposition and through methods which have compared 
findings between experimental laboratory studies versus natural real-life settings.  In part, the 
artificial environment of the experimental laboratory has, as an artifact of the experimental method 
that has been used in a majority of these studies, created the very types of short-term self-fulfilling 
prophecy-effects that FPS cite (see Jussim 1986, 1989, 1991).  That is, once appropriate controls 
related to human nature are introduced (such as: individual dispositions, behaviors, interests, 
preferences, abilities, choices and so forth), and once testing is done in a natural environment rather 
than in a laboratory (or appropriate controls are included for the latter), and once prophecy effects are 
studied over time ? the prophecy-effects relative to human nature-related effects become marginal 
to non-significant (see Jussim 1986, 1989, 1991, Jussim and Harber 2005, Madon et al. 1997, Smith 
et al. 2001).  The significantly more important factors related to human nature, rather than the 
marginal and short-term effects of others’ beliefs and prophecy about it, have now been shown to 
predominate; a finding that has been replicated in several meta-analyses (e.g., Funder 1995).  
Of course we do not want to completely dismiss self-fulfilling prophecy effects.  What is, 
however, important to note is that false beliefs about behavior, which might fulfill themselves in the 
short term, importantly get dynamically corrected and updated in social contexts.  False effects are 
small and dissipate rather quickly over time as individual behavior gives clues or signals about actual 
factors and accurate beliefs related to human nature (Smith et al. 1999).  The more general point here 
is that false “prophecy-effects” are dwarfed by accurate and correct assessment, that is, upon 
receiving further information we dynamically adjust and update our models accordingly (cf. 
McKenzie 2005).  A better way, then, is to conceptualize beliefs and prophecy-effects with a 
“realistic accuracy model” (Funder 1987, 1995, Krueger et al 2003, Krueger and Funder 2004, 
Kruglanski 1989).  In short, prophecies do shape reality, but false ones only marginally, with these 
marginal effects quickly dissipating over time. 
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In all, human nature, then, provides a “limiting condition of prophecy fulfillment” (Jussim 
1986). Put differently, behavior itself is a cause of beliefs and expectations rather than the other way 
around (Funder 1995).  As discussed by Krueger and Funder (2004), scholars have fallen in the trap 
of over-emphasizing situational effects (self-fulfilling prophecy-effects being the specific case in 
point, Jussim 1991) at the expense of variables related to human nature (cf. Jussim 1989).  Thus, with 
reference to FPS’ critique of economics, it may be that self-interest – rightly understood – in fact 
provides a real underlying human motivation, rather than one that is falsely constructed.  
 
DEFENDING (ORGANIZATIONAL) ECONOMICS: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
ARGUMENT 
FPS’s arguments about the self-fulfilling nature of theories, specifically its strong form where 
even false theories fulfill themselves, use economics as the prime example.  They specifically argue 
that the widespread acceptance, diffusion and teaching of economics has in self-fulfilling fashion 
adversely shaped individual behavior and management practice (also see Adler 2001, 2002, FPS, 
Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Ghoshal 2005, Pfeffer 2005, Khurana 2007).  However, FPS and others 
have unnecessarily caricatured economics.  While in the above sections we have established key 
boundaries for the self-fulfilling nature of theories, specifically using examples from economics and 
social psychology, in this section we more generally defend economics, specifically organizational 
economics.  We first argue, in response to FPS, that there are significant and real (individual and 
collective and societal) benefits associated with the infusion of market-mechanisms into 
organizations (Zenger and Hesterly 1997), and thereafter we discuss self-interest rightly understood.  
Market-Mechanisms in Organizations 
In a major application of their argument, FPS (11-22) question the benefits of infusing 
market-mechanisms into organizations, specifically “market-like mechanisms” such as incentives, 
competition and so forth, or as they put it, “American-style management practices” that accentuate 
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and create self-interest (FPS: 11-17).  They argue that an overarching market-logic has crept into 
organizations, resulting in unnecessary downsizing, the “commodification” of employees and poor 
collective and social outcomes (FPS: 19-22). In general, the authors paint a very gloomy picture of 
efforts to infuse market-mechanisms into organizations, even explicitly longing for the better times 
of yesteryear: FPS (19) specifically highlight the organizations of six decades ago as meeting more of 
a “communal” or “familial” image and ideal (also see Adler 2001, Adler and Heckscher 2006).  FPS 
(18-20) further argue that the rhetorical (cf. Barley and Kunda 1992, Eccles and Nohria 1992) 
metaphor of organizations as “community” or “family” has been replaced by a self-interested market 
metaphor: a self-fulfilling “rationalized institutional myth” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) with 
detrimental consequences for management practice and social outcomes. Others have, along similar 
lines, explicitly argued that organizational scholars should avoid “an economic approach to 
organizational analysis” and the “dangerous liaison with economics” (Pfeffer 1997: 192). 
There are, however, very strong reasons to believe that the infusion of market-mechanisms 
into organizations reflects an emerging reality with substantial individual and collective benefits 
(Zenger and Hesterly 1997), rather than a self-fulfilling rhetorical device or myth with mostly 
negative consequences.  Specifically, the work of Todd Zenger and many others shows that there are 
significant benefits associated with the infusion of “markets into hierarchy” (e.g., Zenger 1992, 1994, 
Zenger and Hesterly 1997, Zenger and Lazzarini 2004, Zenger and Marshall 2000).  For example, the 
use of the quintessential market-like mechanism ? “high-powered incentives” (Zenger and Hesterly 
1997) ? in organizations has proven a powerful tool for luring talent and motivating effort.  As 
Zenger and Marshall show in their empirical analysis, “higher incentive-intensity triggers higher 
effort, lures superior talent, and generally yields higher performance levels” (2000: 150, also see 
Gerhart and Milkovich 1990, Teece 2003).  In fact, organizational performance suffers significantly 
if individual incentives (or, “inducements and contributions”) are not properly aligned (March and 
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Simon 1958:130, cf. Simon 1947).  For example, Zenger’s (1994) work further shows how large 
organizations specifically “under-incentivize” the highest-performing individuals, resulting not only 
in the turnover of these individuals, but also resulting in the rather surprising “organizational 
diseconomies” where small organizations perform significantly better (by attracting better talent) 
given better incentive alignment and reward systems (see Zenger 1994, also see Zenger and Lazzarini 
2004). 
High-powered individual incentives of course are not a panacea.  Specifically, as FPS note, 
the associated dispersion in pay and wages may also lead to overall dissatisfaction, social 
comparison, envy, productivity losses, and a more general lack of collaboration in organizations 
(Pfeffer and Langton 1993, Pfeffer 1997, Walster et al 1973 cf. Levine 1993).  How, then, is this 
quandary resolved? Specifically, on the one hand, the negative consequences of pay dispersion would 
suggest that incentives should be more homogeneous and collective (Pfeffer and Langton 1993), 
while, on the other hand, the problems associated with the misalignment of incentives for high 
performers suggest that significant heterogeneity in pay is warranted and needed to optimally induce 
effort (Zenger 1992, 1994).   
Recent market and organizational dynamics, however, suggest some promising solutions to 
the above quandary; FPS (18-20) in fact strongly question the efficacy of some of these market-
dynamics and emerging organizational forms, though we believe that they have had significant 
individual and collective benefits (cf. Cappelli 1999). Specifically, “organizational disaggregation” 
and associated advances in organizational design and forms have allowed for a better alignment of 
talent and interests with individual incentives (Zenger and Hesterly 1997, also see Foss 2003). The 
disaggregation of organizations means that individuals increasingly work in smaller organizational 
settings --- thus for example circumventing problems of deindividuation (Festinger et al 1952) --- 
given improvements in measurement and technology (cf. Brynjolfsson et al. 1994).  These smaller 
organizations and organizational units are not only significantly better at aligning individual 
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incentives with individual expertise, talent and effort (Bresnahan et al. 2002, also see Birch 1987), 
but the smaller size of disaggregated units also in part obviates issues of social comparison and envy 
(see Nickerson and Zenger 2008).  As put by Zenger and Hesterly, “small firms can simply link pay 
to firm performance, deliver high-powered incentives, and largely avoid comparison issues 
altogether” (1997: 213). Furthermore, as shown by Cable and Judge (1994 1996), individuals can and 
do increasingly self-select to interact with “similar others” based not only on their abilities and 
interests and values (Schneider 1987) but also their own incentive-related preferences, and this self-
selection mitigates against many of the problems (for example, by reducing the range of social 
comparison) noted by FPS with regard to the use of high-powered incentives in organizations.   
Related to the disaggregation of organizations, increasingly prevalent professional services 
and partnership-type organizational forms also benefit directly from the infusion of market-
mechanisms into organizations (see Teece 2003). As discussed by Greenwood and Empson (2003), 
principal-agent problems and agency costs are better avoided in partnerships as individual interests, 
abilities and effort naturally align themselves with outcomes as the principal is the agent. And, more 
to the point, the partnership model clearly benefits from the infusion of market-mechanisms into 
organizations, or “superior incentive systems” (Greenwood and Empson 2003: 313); specifically, the 
tournament-model (cf. Lazear and Rosen 1981) ensures that effort and talent are properly rewarded, 
and property rights are better linked to individuals in these knowledge-intensive settings. As noted by 
Teece: “with better incentive alignment” these partnership (and related) forms of organization “can 
begin a virtuous cycle of work freedom and high reward” (2003: 908, Birch 1987). 
All in all, the infusion of markets into hierarchy, far from “commodifying” human capital, as 
suggested by FPS (19), rather radically elevates the status of human capital in better recognizing and 
rewarding individual effort and ability. Furthermore, recent advances in information technology, in 
how the employment relationship is specified (and associated organizational forms), have removed 
many of the problems that FPS highlight with the use of market-mechanisms in organizations (e.g., 
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social comparison costs, social loafing --- Festinger, 1954, Williams et al 1981).  While downsizing, 
as noted by FPS, clearly is a reality which management and employees have to grapple with, and the 
“free-agent”-model of the employment relationship certainly is far from perfect (FPS: 18), 
nonetheless, it must also on the other hand be recognized that recent organizational forms and market 
dynamics have resulted in increased freedom and choice for individuals, and again, in the better 
alignment of incentives (Zenger and Hesterly 1997, cf. Cappelli 1999).  Thus, it needs to be noted 
that the emergence of new ways to specify the employment relationship and new organizational 
forms has also been driven by “a desire for autonomy and employment flexibility” on the part of 
individuals, which has further resulted in individual and societal benefits (Teece 2003: 906, cf. 
Zenger 1994, for an excellent historical analysis of incentives and resultant societal benefits, see 
Clark 2007).     
Now, the markets-in-hierarchy intuition certainly does not suggest that incentives are the 
only solution: of course culture matters, relationships matter, trust matters (cf. Adler 2001, 
Williamson 1993). And, of course misaligned incentives lead to detrimental collective outcomes 
(Gibbon 1998, Kerr 1975, Prendergast 1999).  But, the more important point here is that FPS’s (12-
17) caricature of “American-style” payment systems and high-powered incentives is extreme, 
particularly as incentives have been a central concept since the foundations of organization science 
and theory, as is evident for example in March and Simon’s rather extensive discussion of 
“payments” and “inducements and contributions” (1958: 83-111, also see Barnard’s [1938] 
discussion of incentives and the “organizational equilibrium,” cf. Mahoney 2006: 15, Teece 2003). 
And, FPS’s caricature of incentives is also extreme as it does not recognize the many recent 
innovations in organizational forms; forms that in essence create better incentive alignment (Zenger 
and Hesterly 1997, also see Greenwood and Empson 2003, Teece 2003).7   
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Self-Interest, Rightly Understood  
The picture of self-interest painted by FPS and others (e.g., Ghoshal 2005, Ghoshal and 
Moran 1996) is lopsided.8 Specifically, these scholars fail to recognize that self-interest, specifically 
self-interest “rightly understood,” by no means precludes cooperation, organization, community-
building, trust, or for that matter, any other individual, relational, or organizational virtue (cf. Casson 
1996, Jensen and Meckling 1998, Fehr and Gaechter 2000, Sobel 2005, Williamson 1993, Binmore 
2006a, 2006b).  In fact, self-interest is required and provides an important underlying mechanism and 
driver for realizing improved individual, organizational and societal-level outcomes.  The reason 
economists often exalt self-interest is not because they ascribe particular moral virtue to self-interest 
(in fact, the type of “enlightened” self-interest we have in mind should completely be decoupled from 
ethics), but rather because they recognize that, in the words of the British economist, D.H. Robertson, 
self-interest is needed to economize on “that scarce resource Love, which we know, just as well as 
anybody else, to be the most precious thing in the world” (Robertson 1956: 23).  The central idea is 
that because there are inherent limits to our capacity for reciprocating (time, cost, ability and so 
forth) and limits to how far we can and will extend our personal obligations, we need to leave much, 
including the fulfilment of our material needs, to markets driven by self-interest: to individual 
judgments about what best maximizes one’s scarce resources such as time and effort. An even 
stronger argument asserts that even if “love” was universal, we would still need to rely on self-
interest and markets, because these are the best known mechanisms for making use of dispersed 
knowledge in society (Hayek 1945). Thus, entirely benevolent and altruistic agents would still face 
the problem of making efficient use of dispersed knowledge; in contrast, markets driven by self-
interest make efficient use of dispersed knowledge.   
Such arguments essentially link self-interest at the individual-level with beneficial outcomes 
at the collective level. The initial intuition for this, of course, was provided by Adam Smith (cf. 
Werhane 1989), who famously pointed out that we do not expect to get the goods from the “butcher, 
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the baker and the brewer” by appealing to their benevolence but by appealing to their self-interest. 
Smith’s invisible hand explanation of the micro-macro link has individuals self-select into 
environments where they realize the best outcomes for themselves, but also, unintentionally, 
beneficially contributing to collective and societal outcomes (Clark 2007: 145-147, Frydman and 
Phelps 1983). The context of self-selection in labor markets perhaps provides an apt example of the 
“invisible hand.” Individuals select environments and organizations where they, in their own best 
judgment, can best maximize the returns from their knowledge and abilities, and, this also has wider-
scale benefits for society (cf. Zenger 1992, 1994, also see Cable and Judge 1994, 1996, Schneider 
1987, Teece 2003).   
 In contrast, FPS focus wholly on the potentially negative collective outcomes of individual 
self-interest.  While no economist condones immoral or unethical behavior, somehow organizational 
scholars have recently drawn explicit links between self-interest and recent corporate ethics scandals, 
asserting direct causal influences (e.g., Adler 2002, Pfeffer 2005, cf. Harris and Bromiley 2007).  For 
example, Ghoshal provocatively argues that “many of the worst excesses of recent management 
practices have their roots in a set of ideas that have emerged from business school academics over the 
last 30 years,” specifically referring to ideas diffusing from economics into business schools (2005: 
75, cf. Khurana 2007). However, no direct links have been established between the diffusion and 
acceptance of economics and unethical behavior that meet any standards of scientific rigor: 
defections in game theory, based on experimental findings, simply do not equate with bad 
management practice or unethical behavior (FPS: 14). Furthermore, the artificially primed 
experimental situations where language is used to highlight self-interested economic behavior (see 
FPS: 16, Liberman et al. 2004) can simply be interpreted as efforts by the subjects to get short-term 
cues for behavior rather than evidence for economics “falsely” creating self-interested, unethical 
behavior (or, see Laband and Beil 1999).   
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Overall, given the relatively short history of the corporate form and business education (cf. 
Khurana 2007), and without objective data (other than the particularly salient, recent business 
scandals), and without a relative comparison to previous periods, statements about economics falsely 
creating self-interest are premature.  Surely self-interested behavior existed prior to the recent 
emergence of the neoclassical model of economics.  In idealizing and advocating the organizational 
forms of decades ago, and in assigning virtues to organizational forms of the past (see FPS: 19, Adler 
and Heckscher 2006:14, 67-77), it seems that management scholars may have fallen in a similar type 
of trap of “retrospective idealization” as some anthropologists who long admired and advocated the 
peaceful and communal and historical arrangements associated with tribal life ? secluded from 
markets, self and competition ? though objective data has revealed that the worst of human 
excesses, self-interest and violence occurred during those exact time periods (see Keeley 1996, cf. 
Pinker 2002).  On the other hand, it is after the introduction of market-promoting and incentive-
enhancing institutions that both individual and societal welfare has radically improved on every 
measurable dimension (for an overview, see Clark 2007).   
We of course do not mean to suggest that economics has all the answers. Scarcely so, we 
indeed have highlighted some of the problematic assumptions of economics (e.g., hyper-rationality) 
and noted problems with incentives (e.g., misalignment).  But, our central point has been to highlight 
that there are vast benefits associated with both economic reasoning and market-mechanisms more 
generally, and thus organizational scholars should not be so quick to dismiss these positive elements 
of economics as they can significantly enhance our understanding of organizations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to respond to recent arguments concerning the role that 
economics purportedly plays in adversely shaping human behavior, management practice, and 
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organizational and societal outcomes (FPS).  We have specifically addressed the key mechanism 
used by many to highlight why economics has unduly and adversely influenced human behavior and 
management practice ? that is, the self-fulfilling nature of (even false) theories.  We have explicated 
two key boundary conditions for the self-fulfilling nature of theories, that is, objective reality and 
human nature.  An understanding of the implications of these two boundaries fundamentally changes 
the conclusions of FPS.  Specifically, (false) theories do not arbitrarily influence behavior or 
practice; rather, theories tend to influence reality to the extent to which they approximate underlying 
objective reality, thus, for example, requiring a correct specification of human nature.  “True” 
approximations or theories of reality, then, in turn also help shape reality, though the first-order role 
of theory ? from the perspective of scientific realism ? is to help explain, predict and understand 
reality (Popper 1972, Psillos 1999), and secondarily these more correct models then in turn shape 
reality and lead to scientific progress.     
Economics, then, may actually offer some broad truths about human behavior, rather than 
merely being a rhetorical device or falsely self-fulfilling prophecy resulting in bad management 
practice and poor collective outcomes, as is argued by FPS.  That is, some aspects of economics may 
well “hold sway” because they build off of a clear and general core model of human action and 
nature which is not that far removed from real human action and nature (cf. Jensen and Meckling 
1998) and because economics has been fairly successful with respect to identifying real mechanisms 
? we have indeed highlighted recent work on the role of high-powered incentives in organizations 
as an example and case in point (e.g., Zenger and Hesterly 1997, Zenger and Marshall 2000).   
In all, our effort here has been to provide the other side of the argument in response to FPS 
(and many others), to explicate key boundaries for the self-fulfilling nature of theories, and to note 
many of the benefits associated with the infusion of market-mechanisms into organizations.  We 
certainly recognize that our arguments may be controversial to some, particularly as discussions 
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about why and how theories influence reality closely mirror what appear to be fundamentally 
irreconcilable epistemological debates in philosophy (see Bloor 1991, Boghossian 2006, Bricmont 
and Sokal 2004, Brown 1994, Kuhn 1970, Latour 1999, Popper 1972).  Nonetheless, given the rather 
one-sided recent discussions in management and social science outlets about how some theories 
falsely fulfill themselves and adversely shape human behavior ? economics being the prime 
example ? we have argued and shown that there is equally persuasive and voluminous support from 
the social sciences, philosophy, and organizational economics for differing conclusions.   
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
1
 FPS argue that the economic language of self-interest and competition creates self-interested and competitive 
behavior. FPS argue more generally, that “language affects what people see, how they see it, and the social 
categories and descriptors they use to interpret their reality.  It shapes what people notice and ignore and what they 
believe is and is not important” (FPS: 9, also see Astley 1985, Bloor 1991, Latour 1999). However, FPS thesis of 
“linguistic determinism,” originally conceived of in anthropology (specifically see Boas 1911, Sapir 1911, 1929, 
Whorf 1956; cf. Kay and Kempton 1984), has been directly challenged and questioned by linguists and 
psychologists. For example, a vast body of research in psychology shows that despite large heterogeneity in color 
names and categories across languages, individuals nonetheless see reality (in this case, colors) in the same fashion 
(see e.g., Berlin and Kay 1969, Heider and Olivier 1972, Kay 1999). In other words, this research shows that 
independent of the language associated with colors, individuals nonetheless see and experience reality in similar 
fashion, thus providing support for an objective and universal reality.  For a large list of references (in numerous 
domains of psychology) and an exhaustive overview of problems with the thesis of language strongly influencing 
behavior, thought and perceptions of reality, see Pinker 2002, 2007. 
 
2
 There are many variants of scientific realism (Bricmont and Sokal 2004, Kitcher 2003, Popper, 1972; Psillos, 
1999), but, the contrast between these variants of realism and FPS’s underlying epistemological approach (e.g., see 
their citations of MacKenzie, Dumont etc) is large enough that making fine-grained distinctions of realism is not 
necessary for our arguments. That said, we might note that what we are advocating here reflects a “moderate” 
scientific realism (cf. Haack 1998), which recognizes that 1) theories of course can also be wrong (though, they get 
corrected over time and progress is the norm of science), and 2) that theories are only approximations of reality 
rather than capital-T “Truth.” 
 
3
 The nature of economic theories and models themselves, it is argued, then is explicitly (though this remains 
implicit in most work, see MacKenzie, 2006) arbitrary in nature (i.e. their truth value is not of interest), specifically 
as it is the social, technological and political factors, rather than the models themselves, that receive primacy in 
determining whether a theory obtains.  In line with this, Michel Callon argues that economic models and theories are 
“arbitrary conventions” (2007: 321-323).   
 
4
 To briefly dive more carefully into this point of how individuals are falsely duped into behaving in certain ways, it 
is instructive to see how self-fulfilling false prophecies versus self-destroying false prophecies are used in the extant 
management literature. That is, an appeal to self-defeating false prophecy suggests that individuals have an ability to 
judge objective reality and to make appropriate judgments – to act counter to the false prophecy - while falsely self-
fulfilling prophecies suggest that individuals, as noted by FPS (19), “mindlessly” duped into behaving falsely. So, a 
brief and rough analysis of the top organizational journals (in JSTOR, including the following management journals: 
Organization Science, Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Review, Academy of 
Management Journal) reveals that the term “self-fulfilling prophecy” is invoked over 2000+ times in these journals 
(adding the “Pygmalion effect” to this count would radically tip the scales even further). Most always the 
connotation is that individuals have been falsely led to believe and act in certain ways that are individually or 
collectively hurtful. On the other hand, “self-defeating” (or “destroying” or “negating”) appears only 24 times; self-
defeating prophecies again are (largely) situations where individuals act against false beliefs and false expectations, 
suggesting a measure of rationality.  (We of course understand that the concept of self-fulfilling versus –destroying 
prophecies can be used to make opposing arguments depending on whether the prophecies are specified as false or 
true, though, most of the literature generally points to fulfillment in the case of false situations.) So, when a scholar 
or subject “learns” the potential for, or existence of, some kind of cognitive bias or error, they then can deliberately 
ensure that they don’t “fall for it,” (presuming they have enough information on probabilities etc). Grunberg points 
out that economists “… were and apparently still are concerned mainly with self-defeating public prediction. 
Sociologists seem to be interested more in self-fulfilling ones” (1986: 476). In sum, while Ghoshal and Moran 
(1996), FPS, and Ghoshal (2005) highlight self-fulfilling prophecies, prophecies may also be self-defeating or self-
negating (Elster 1989). When, how, and why one or the other occurs (self-fulfilling or defeating) is in part 
articulated in our discussion of objective reality as a boundary (in particularly in our discussion of rationality) and 
also implied in our discussion of human nature. 
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5
 We are of course aware of research which has questioned human rationality and highlighted its problems and 
biases (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1996); and, as we have discussed, hyper-rationality or omniscience of course 
suggests an extreme that simply is not true.  However, that said, recent theoretical and empirical research by social 
psychologists such as McKenzie, Krueger, Oaksford, Funder, Stanovich, Gigerenzer and numerous others has quite 
persuasively shown that an increased measure of rationality in human decision-making is warranted – specifically, 
biases are efficient and smart heuristics in information-deprived situations.  Furthermore, some of the problems of 
“mindless behavior” and human rationality in the past have had more to do with methodological misspecifications 
on the part of scholars than misspecification on the part of the subjects that are being studied and labeled irrational 
(see Krueger and Funder 2004). That is, when looked at post hoc, it has appears as if people are quite irrational and 
readily duped into behaving falsely and making poor decisions – as the case of a run on a bank suggests. However, 
recent calibrations and corrections to models of rationality and decision-making – specifically, calibrations that 
account for (a) information availability (at the time of the decision), (b) time and (c) individual differences – have 
suggested that models highlighting systematic human irrationality need to be amended, and decision-making is 
driven by efficient heuristics suited for the complex environments that individuals and organizations operate in (see 
Funder 1987, Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Krueger and Funder 2004, McKenzie 2003, 2005, McKenzie and Mikkelsen 
2007, Oaksford and Chater 1996, Stanovich 1999, Stanovich and West 2000).   
 
6
 Taking human nature seriously has wide implications for strong forms of self-fulfilling prophecy where it is 
suggested that socially constructed beliefs of others in essence create and construct human nature itself.   However, 
there has been an increasing recognition in other disciplines about the need to consider human nature, for example in 
sociology (see Freese, Li and Wade 2003), and in anthropology (see e.g., Freeman 1999, Malotki 1983, Martin 
1986, Pinker 2002; Pullum 1991, Pinker 2002).  
 
7
 One can turn the tables on FPS’s argument and say that their situational thesis ? specifically, rather than the 
thesis focusing on the benefits of market-mechanisms in organizations (cf. Zenger and Hesterly 1997) ? 
“commodifies” employees.  That is, while the markets-in-hierarchy intuition explicitly recognizes heterogeneity in 
human capital and focuses on appropriately rewarding individual effort and talent (see Nickerson and Zenger 2008, 
Zenger 1994, Zenger and Marshall 2000), FPS’s situational logic, on the other hand, logically implies a priori 
individual-level homogeneity as all of the explanatory burden is placed on organization-level determinants of 
individual competence and organizational performance (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989, cf. Cable and Judge 1994, 
1996, Schneider 1987).  In short, if organizations indeed are “strong situations,” as argued by Davis-Blake and 
Pfeffer (1989) and clearly implied in the arguments of FPS, then matters such as turnover and other individual-level 
factors (many of which are central to human capital) must be considered theoretically more peripheral.  Overall, FPS 
mis-specify sources of underlying heterogeneity.  For a more thorough discussion about the underlying need to 
appropriately specify individual and organizational [nested] heterogeneity and homogeneity, see Felin and Hesterly 
2007.   
 
8
 Note that here we do not cover the negative side of self-interest, specifically self-interest seeking “with guile,” 
given Williamson’s thorough response to this issue (specifically see Williamson 1996, cf. Ghoshal and Moran 
1996).  That is, TCE prescribes institutions to guard against collectively-hurtful self-interest-seeking behavior, given 
that some (not all) people indeed do act in collectively hurtful, unethical ways.  
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